"The real strength of a nation lies in its workers, its thinkers, its fighters, and its mothers."
— Halford Mackinder, "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength," National Review (1905)
Demographics has long been a core component of geopolitical study and the source of much debate. One influential instance is Thomas Malthus' assessment in the late 18th century that population growth would outstrip food and other resource availability, which has significantly impacted political and ecological theories and policies, as well as popular culture perceptions of apocalyptic futures, often tainted with fear of nuclear war. On the other hand, there is currently much hand-wringing over population growth stagnation and even negative population growth in some countries. Despite the vast differences between these modes of thought, they agree on one thing: demographics plays a major role in shaping global dynamics.
We often hear that "demographics is destiny," a phrase best attributed to Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg in their 1970 book "The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate." And yet population alone cannot be seen as a determinant of the relative success or weakness of a country. India and China each have approximately the same population, as do Switzerland and Sierra Leone, but we do not assume each of those pairs has the same geopolitical "destiny" simply because they have the same population size. Even a youth bulge in a population doesn't dictate what will occur. A population boom can lead to a national social crisis if there is insufficient opportunity, or lead to national economic acceleration if the labor can be effectively harnessed.
It's true that we see demographics linked to the economic potential of a country, such as Adam Smith's linkages between population change, division of labor and productivity, or Halford Mackinder's discussions of manpower in relation to economic and national strength. Yet we also see the way technology can change productivity rates, even without additional manpower. Note that Mackinder's ideas cross over to questions about military might, something Alfred Thayer Mahan also linked to demographics, primarily in terms of ensuring a large share of economic activity is concentrated in a domestic merchant marine.
In the vein of national defense, military power is a combination of manpower, materiel, a technological and industrial base, economics and, of course, strategy and leadership. All other things being equal, manpower can prove decisive, even if only from an attrition standpoint. But all things are not equal. Some countries view manpower as a key resource to be exploited for military purposes, as seen in Russia and the Soviet Union before it, which have often proved willing to use mass to overcome technological and materiel deficiencies. Others, like the United States, traditionally conserve manpower and replace it with technology, pursuing overwhelming force through weapons systems to overcome a nearly universal manpower imbalance in any fight away from U.S. shores.
We see frequent assertions that growing populations lead to war, or that internal population distortions contribute to a "martial spirit" and encourage conflict over cooperation. For instance, China's massive population and its large imbalance of men to women are often seen as a compulsion for Beijing to go to war with Taiwan. Yet Quincy Wright's massive 1942 two-volume "A Study of War" clearly and empirically highlights how demographic imbalances can and do lead to very different outcomes. His summary of the argument, in a revised version of Chapter 31 published in the 1944 book "Compass of the World," noted succinctly that "the character and influence of a particular population change is so dependent on other factors that it is impossible to predict from a study of population phenomena alone what international policies or occurrences to expect." Russia, for example, continues to have a higher percentage of women to men in the population, yet regularly engages in military action to achieve political ends.
Perhaps most often, we see demographic ideas manipulated for political purposes, often connected to race and nationalism. Migration may often be empirically shown to increase economic activity and thus national economic strength, but perceptions of changing cultural norms or shifting job types (more often driven by the internationalization of the division of labor than by immigration) can readily give rise to anti-immigrant nativist sentiments and policies. Even within countries, demographic differences across regions can and do shape domestic politics, and often spill over into international relations. As Will and Ariel Durant summarized in their 1968 book "The Lessons of History," "Inequality grows in an expanding economy." And inequality — between peoples, regions or nations — is often a significant contributing factor to friction, competition and conflict, though it may also drive collaboration.
In recent years, particularly in the Global North, traditional expectations and societal patterns have shifted, highlighting numerous demographic inequalities. We see dual pressures of increasing longevity and decreasing birth rates that have led to an ageing population and mismatches in labor demand and supply; it is not uncommon to see even slowing-growth populations face youth un- and underemployment as older workers refuse to leave the workforce and technology erodes opportunity from the other direction. There are significant questions about how different generations save or spend, based on their current place along life's path, and thus what will happen to available capital when large elderly populations shift from saving to spending, all while increasing the draw on social services that a smaller replacement labor pool will have to support. Smith's links between population and economic activity continue to shape questions for economists, political scientists, geopoliticians and industry, but the simple relations asserted in the 19th century no longer appear to hold.
Demographics may not be destiny, but it does play a major role in the opportunities and risks nations face, and in the political and social perceptions within and between countries. Demographic changes are often slow, and state policies to constrain or encourage natural population growth often falter in the face of more organic economic, social and cultural patterns. As a result, "managing" demographics may well be outside the scope of national power, aside from minor regulatory adjustments to facilitate or constrain immigration. Still, the politics and sentiments around population patterns reinforce ideologies and provide ample room for political exploitation. Meanwhile, new technology drives and is driven by changing demographic patterns, as in the case of the Industrial Revolution and its impact on population trends, or in the rise of biomedical technology and the more rapid adoption of artificial intelligence and robotics today. Conflict can also rapidly reshape the demographics of a state, as seen in the U.S. baby boom after World War II, and Russia's lingering demographic imbalance between women and men (currently around 86.5 men per 100 women, but as low as 76.6 men to 100 women in 1950).
In 2024, the fellows at the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RANE explored the question of demographics and its relationship to national power. The outcome was a narrowly focused study of the impact of demographic trends on the future of the Japanese and South Korean militaries, accounting for their distinct military priorities. Over the next several months, RANE will further explore the relationship between demographics and other aspects of national power. We will look at differing responses to demographic stagnation or decline through immigration, technology or nationalization of labor, how demographic changes may impact defense alliances or patterns of transnational militancy, how intra-state regional differences in demographic patterns impact political and economic developments, and how generational differences and youth bulges may reshape risks and opportunities in developing nations. Our study will circle the globe, from Chinese urbanization to Latin American youth poverty, Indian climate migration to Russian foreign policy, and East African economic prospects to European defense spending. Through each lens, we will seek to tie together both the unique local elements and the broader international implications.
