Analysts from RANE unpacked the cascading business and economic risks of a conflict that is reshaping energy markets, food security, and the global industrial supply chain.
Based on RANE Webinar: March 25, 2026
WEBINAR SPEAKERS
Matthew Bey - Senior Global Analyst & Head of Methodology, RANE · Moderator
Kristin Ronzi - Middle East and North Africa Analyst, RANE
Matteo Ilardo - Lead Europe Analyst, RANE
Missed our live briefing? The full replay is now available. RANE analysts walk through key scenarios, risk vectors, and the strategic questions every global organization should be asking right now.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
→ Diplomatic talks have stalled as both the U.S. and Iran maintain maximalist positions
→ The Strait of Hormuz closure disrupts 20% of global oil and LNG trade with no easy alternative
→ Brent crude near $100/barrel; Qatar LNG damage has knocked 17% of production offline
→ Fertilizer, sulfur, and helium shortages threaten global food and industrial production
→ Gulf states are shifting toward deeper U.S. cooperation, but long-term hedging is expected
The United States put forward a 15-point framework to end hostilities, demanding that Iran decommission its key nuclear sites at Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz, halt enrichment, and cut support for regional proxies — in exchange for full sanctions relief. Iran rejected every condition, countering with demands for anend to all strikes, security guarantees against future attacks, and war damage compensation.
RANE Senior Analyst Matthew Bey characterized both positions as maximalist, notingthat Iran's demand for compensation echoes its stance after the U.S. withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal. The war has not altered either side's core demands— a sign that a durable settlement is unlikely in the near term. Iran, meanwhile, has interpreted recent delays in U.S. military strikes as a tactical maneuver to build up forces rather than a genuine diplomatic overture.
"The war has not altered either side's core demands— and recent assassinations of Iranian leaders have only hardened Tehran's stance."
On the military front, the U.S. has deployed 2,000–3,000 paratroopers from the8 2nd Airborne Division and positioned amphibious ready groups with Marines, expanding options for potential ground operations. RANE Middle East Analyst Kristin Ronzi projected an acceleration of airstrikes against Iranian air defenses over the coming weeks, with early targets potentially including peripheral islands before moving to strategically critical locations like Kharg Island — the hub for Iranian oil exports.
20% of global oil & LNG trade through the Strait of Hormuz
17% of Qatar's LNG production knocked offline
~$100 Brent crude per barrel and rising
$2M Iran's demanded transit fee per vessel
The physical destruction of Gulf infrastructure has been limited — but the closureof the Strait of Hormuz has produced outsized disruptions. Some oil has been rerouted via Saudi pipelines, but LNG has no comparable bypass. Two of Qatar's14 LNG trains have been knocked offline, triggering force majeure declarations and driving European natural gas prices sharply higher at a moment when storage levels are already low.
Yet markets are not fully pricing in a prolonged crisis. RANE Europe Analyst Matteo Ilardo pointed to airlines that are not fully hedging jet fuel costs as evidence that the market still expects a relatively quick resolution. If that expectation proves wrong and the conflict extends, energy prices could spike far beyond current levels — with cascading consequences across transport, manufacturing, and food production, where oil and gas are key feedstocks for fertilizers and plastics.
Iran has attempted to manage the disruption by imposing a $2 million per-vessel transit fee and allowing passage to non-adversarial nations like China and Iraq. Ronzi was skeptical this system would restore meaningful shipping volumes, citing ambiguity about which countries qualify, the persistent threat of drifting mines, and resistance from the U.S. and Europe to acknowledging Iranian authority over the strait.
The disruptions are hitting Europe particularly hard. The continent's plans under the Repower EU strategy call for phasing out Russian gas — but that strategy assumed a coming global LNG supply glut that may now not materialize. The combination of reduced Qatari LNG output, low storage levels, and fierce competition from Asian buyers for available cargoes has sent European naturalgas prices climbing.
Ilardo noted that while some European countries, particularly Hungary and Slovakia, are already pushing to relax tariffs on Russian and Belarusian fertilizers, the broader political calculus has not yet forced a reversal on Russian gas policy. If the conflict drags on, however, Europe could face a painful choice between its geopolitical commitments and industrial competitiveness.
The conflict's commodity ripples extend well beyond oil and gas. The Gulf produces a substantial share of the world's sulfur — a byproduct of petroleum refining that is essential for making fertilizers and a key input in semiconductor manufacturing. Qatar is also among the world's largest exporters of helium, used in medical equipment, scientific research, and chip fabrication. Disruptions to both could reduce industrial yields and throughput, particularly in Asia.
Ronzi highlighted the fertilizer market as an especially sensitive pressure point, given the timing sensitivity of agricultural seasons. Saudi Arabia is a major phosphate rock producer; the broader Gulf supplies natural gas used to manufacture nitrogen fertilizers. A prolonged conflict during critical planting windows could lower application rates globally — raising food prices and testing the fiscal limits of countries like India that heavily subsidize fertilizer for farmers. Countries dependent on Indian rice exports, such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, could face secondary food security risks if India responded with export restrictions.
In the aluminum sector, Bahrain's major producer has declared force majeure due to export difficulties through the strait — even though its facilities remain undamaged. For the U.S., tariffs on aluminum imports are amplifying the price pressure on automakers and other manufacturers. Industries in Asia, with greater capacity to absorb costs through government subsidies, may prove more resilient.
Initially neutral, Gulf states are growing more aligned with U.S. objectives as Iran has targeted their own critical infrastructure, including desalination plants and power facilities. Saudi Arabia has now granted the U.S. use of King Fahd Air Base — a notable policy shift. Ronzi expects this alignment to deepen in the short term, as Gulf states depend on U.S. security guarantees.
Over the medium to long term, however, the calculus may shift. Recent Iranian strikes on Qatar despite U.S. assurances have exposed the limits of American protection. Ronzi predicted that Gulf states will increasingly look to diversify their security partnerships and build out their own defense capabilities — reducing their reliance on Washington.
Operation Epic Fury's stated goals — eliminating Iran's missile and naval capabilities, severing proxy support, and preventing nuclear acquisition — are broadly defined by design. Bey argued the White House has structured its objectives to allow a declaration of success even if full achievement proves impossible: degrading 75–80% of Iran's missile forces, or pointing to economic pressure as a proxy constraint on proxy funding, could be framed as victory. The administration's willingness to tolerate economic pain from rising gasoline prices — a historically reliable drag on incumbent parties — will likely set the real timetable.
On Iran's side, Ronzi assessed the country as determined but not unlimited. Russia and China have offered limited support — intelligence sharing, drone components— but both have publicly called for de-escalation and are keeping their involvement peripheral. If Iran's arsenal degrades without meaningful resupply, its ability to sustain the conflict will erode. The question is whether diplomacy can create an off-ramp before that point — or whether the exhaustion of both sides forces one.
