“The problem of Asia is a world problem, which has come upon the world in an age when, through the rapidity of communication, it is wide awake and sensible as never before, and by electrical touch, to every stirring in its members, and to the tendency thereof. But sensitiveness is not the same thing as understanding, any more than symptoms are identical with diagnosis.” - Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia, 1900.
In The Problem of Asia, Alfred T. Mahan, a key U.S. geopolitical thinker, sought to understand and highlight the significance of changes in Eurasia and its periphery, its role in the global balance of power, and the future of Asian power. While much of what he wrote would today be politically considered “representative of his times,” two aspects of Mahan’s approach remain particularly applicable today. First, he raises the importance of taking both a long and short view simultaneously - i.e. he argues that one must consider the now in its broader historical and geographical context. In this, he also remonstrates the importance of taking both a broad superficial overview and digging into the specific details; the former to frame trends and concepts, the latter to test and challenge such generalizations. And second, Mahan cautions his readers that sensitiveness, or awareness, of changes in a place are not the same as understanding that place. Once again, the superficial needs the focus to remain representative of reality, just as the details need context to make sense of them.
Today, assessments of China, particularly from the United States, are frequently either broad superficial assertions or collections of select details attempting to paint a particular picture. China is portrayed as a country trying to actively overturn the global status quo - often for ideological reasons - or it is revealed as a country that is plagued with internal problems and always on the verge of implosion. In some ways, the ten-feet-tall versus paper-tiger assessments mirror U.S. views of the Soviets during the Cold War. Both stem from a combination of information gaps, a tendency toward mirror imaging (or its overcompensated counterpart of assuming no structural logic to the opponent), or intentional or subtle ideological bias ahead of analysis - in other words pre-judging evidence to fit a particular end assessment. Such analysis risks misunderstanding the drivers and constraints of China’s leadership, and thus failing to accurately predict likely courses of action and response. When built into policy, this can lead to counterproductive actions and a shift back to the reactive when anticipated results fail to materialize.
In April, I had the opportunity to participate in the 2nd Maritime Security Conference in Greece, where I presented on Sino-US Competition in the West Pacific and Enclosed Seas. Taking Mahan’s advice, I sought to explain the drivers of Chinese behavior in their maritime near abroad and beyond. While it is important to assess the impacts of Chinese actions on U.S. strategic interests, or in this case on the future of the global shipping industry, and to assess Chinese capabilities, it is perhaps even more important to know when and how China may use those capabilities, and what aspects of Chinese policies and actions are perceived in Beijing as critical versus merely important or opportunistic - and thus what might shift and what may not. Understanding China, or any other other, is not justifying or supporting their policies or actions, though that is a frequent accusation that undermines strategic analysis. Rather, it is essential to determine which actions or policies may be more effective, and how the future environment is likely to shape out.
Looking at China from a geographically Chinese perspective, it is easy to see why both China’s rapid naval buildout and its Belt and Road initiative largely coincide. Between China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and China’s rapid economic growth in the first decade of the 2000s, the Chinese economy as a whole (rather than just some regions of China) became dependent upon foreign trade, both for the input of materials and the export of finished products. China’s energy dependence on the Middle East grew rapidly, its consumption of iron ore, copper and other key mineral inputs quickly exceeded domestic production, employment became tied to export industries, and risks to trade could undermine economic growth and social stability, weakening the government itself. A brief look along the Chinese coast, where maritime trade traversed, shows a ring of U.S. allies or partners enclosing China’s access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and thus its access to international trade. In a double arch, the United States had permanent or rotational military presence in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, a strong relationship with Singapore, expanding military ties with Vietnam, emerging ties with Indonesia and Malaysia, a treaty alliance with Thailand on the far side of the Strait of Malacca, a key defense relationship with Australia, and expanding defense ties with India. At the intersection of the East and South China Seas, where these two arches come together, sits Taiwan, the keystone of any potential U.S. containment of China.
Even from this initial cursory glance at regional geography, China’s naval expansion, its island campaign in the South China Sea, its coercion strategy with Taiwan, and the build out of alternative routes through the Belt and Road Initiative make strategic sense. Beijing could have chosen alternative ways of dealing with this strategic issue - geography is not deterministic. But the decision to pursue their own Monroe Doctrine in their enclosed seas fits the pattern of a nation that is dependent upon seaborne trade, and fears foreign capability and possible intent to constrain that trade. The use of multiple strategies (land and sea routes, investment in key regional and global port infrastructure, a combination of economic enticement and coercion, etc) also show that China continues to experiment with solutions to, or at least management of, a perceived strategic challenge. Ideology and politics play a role, but these are added to an underlying geographic and strategic reality, one that will shape the application of ideology to policies.
While this is just a small piece of the overall picture of the Chinese puzzle for U.S. policy makers and even more for businesses and organizations with international operations and exposure (who have less of a role in shaping strategic response and action), it provides a starting point for thinking about where China may alter its actions, where it may feel it has few other options, and more importantly, why Beijing persists in certain behaviors and policies despite global economic or soft-power consequences. Building out a fuller model of Chinese perceptions will offer a more robust set of scenarios that can be assessed for impacts and implications, and monitored for likelihood, reducing the sense of uncertainty over the future and helping identify mitigation strategies, new opportunities, and ways to navigate a shifting world order.
