In a recent webinar, RANE analysts discussed what Israel's October 27 election could mean for the region. Here are the key takeaways.
Israel's low 3.25% electoral treshold makes coalition-building highly fluid — polling reflects assumed alliances, not fixed outcomes. Analysts see roughly equal odds of a Netanyahu-led government or a Gadi Eisenkot-led opposition government, with two less likely but still plausible paths: a return to the unstable "revolving government" cycle seen from 2018–2022, or a right-wing government that excludes Netanyahu himself if he's ousted from Likud.
Any government will prioritize preventing Hamas and Hezbollah from rearming, preserving freedom of action in Syria and Yemen, and stopping Iran's nuclear and missile programs. The real difference is risk appetite: a Netanyahu government is more willing to act unilaterally and absorb friction with Washington; an Eisenkot government would likely seek tighter US coordination and give diplomacy more room before escalating — though it would still act decisively against an imminent threat like Iranian nuclear breakout.
Both camps would resist Hamas rearmament, but Netanyahu has a lower threshold to resume major operations; Eisenkot would preserve the existing reconstruction framework longer. The same pattern holds on Hezbollah (Netanyahu more willing to strike preventively inside Lebanon) and Syria. Iran is where the election matters most — Netanyahu is more likely to act alone, while Eisenkot would favor closer coordination with Washington.
Riyadh has been clear it needs a credible pathway to a Palestinian state before any normalization steps, and neither a Netanyahu nor an Eisenkot government is likely to reverse course on settlement expansion or military operations in Gaza and the West Bank. At most, a US-brokered breakthrough under an Eisenkot government could restart the process, but rapid progress isn't expected.
Following the November 3 US midterms, Congress is expected to grow more skeptical of Israeli military operations, particularly under a more assertive Netanyahu government — with possible efforts to slow or condition offensive weapons shipments. However, strong pro-Israel sentiment in Congress makes a major policy shift unlikely from one election cycle; expect gradual, not dramatic, change. Separately, Netanyahu's push for a 10-year plan toward Israeli weapons self-sufficiency reflects a longer-term hedge against exactly this kind of friction.
Friction with Europe over settlements and Gaza will persist, more acutely under a Netanyahu government. But the EU's dependence on Israeli tech and semiconductors, plus its internal divisions (Spain and the Netherlands have imposed settler-related sanctions; others remain more pro-Israel), will keep the EU from presenting a unified front. The US-Israel relationship will remain the primary driver of any real policy shift, not European pressure.
International partners will judge the new government by policy outcomes in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon— not simply by who holds the prime minister's office. An Eisenkot government could present a less confrontational image and ease tensions gradually, but shared post-October 7 security imperatives (freedom of military action, opposition to immediate Palestinian statehood) mean underlying friction with Europe and other partners will persist regardless.
RANE frames the West Bank as part of Israel's "geographic core" — meaning Israel must eventually choose between violent conquest/displacement, assimilation (as with Israeli Arabs), or a federation/"one-and-a-half state" model. A Netanyahu government empowering Ben-Gvir and Smotrich leans toward the conquest path; an Eisenkot government — which would likely require Arab parties like Ra'am in its coalition — keeps the door open to the one-and-a-half state option.
Years of war have intensified pressure to draft ultra-Orthodox citizens into the military, a demand ultra-Orthodox parties resist. A government dependent on ultra-Orthodox parties risks backlash from reservists and secular voters; a government pushing broader conscription risks clashes with the ultra-Orthodox community itself. Either way, this is flagged as a likely source of political paralysis — and a longer-term risk given the ultra-Orthodox population's growing share of Israel's workforce and lower educational outcomes.
Israel has shown consistent resilience to shocks from COVID, the Ukraine war, and the Iran conflict. A right-wing coalition is more likely to pursue tax cuts alongside continued ultra-Orthodox subsidies; an opposition government would likely prioritize fiscal consolidation. A prolonged coalition-formation period could itself deter foreign investment. The tech sector — critical to exports — faces its own AI-driven disruption, and analysts flagged a potential AI-bubble correction as a bigger risk to Israel's economy than regional conflict given how central tech and semiconductors are to it.
Analysts are skeptical that Trump would hold off on renewed Iran strikes even if Netanyahu loses, despite his rhetoric suggesting otherwise — mounting US frustration over stalled negotiations, Strait of Hormuz disruptions, and elevated oil prices, plus a new carrier deployment to the region, make renewed operations likely post-midterms. A Netanyahu government would be more likely to join unilaterally; an Eisenkot government would wait for explicit US coordination. Iran's own continued escalation could also drag Washington back into conflict regardless of Israeli politics.
Covert Israeli-Saudi security and intelligence cooperation (already an open secret) could deepen further given shared concerns about Iran and the Houthis, but this falls well short of normalization given the unresolved Palestinian issue and Saudi Arabia's deepening ties with Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt — a dynamic Israel views warily. Separately, Israeli-Turkish friction over Syria is expected to persist under any government, as Turkey deepens ties with Damascus while Israel supports a buffer zone and the Druze in southern Syria.
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